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I.

Statement

Of The Case

A. Replv T0 Respondent’s Nature

Of The Case

Respondent (hereafter “Hillen”) contends the lower court concluded Hillen had proven the
elements of ejectment. For that t0 be

true, the

lower court would need t0 declare that Hillen, as a

matter 0f fact and as a matter 0f law, was the “titled owner” of Decedent’s property, Which the

lower court did not say he was, but instead

is

0n record saying, with respect

to ownership, “it

doesn’t matter”, yet Appellant (Gibson) and his attorney Vernon K. Smith (“Vernon”), the 2/3rds
heir of Victoria H. Smith, the Decedent,

element 0f “ownership”
action, plaintiff

is

contend

fundamental and

must prove “ownership”,

it

does matter, as the law has declared that the

critical t0

the ﬁrst 0f three elements to be proven in such a

proceeding—thus a controlling factor and reason for
well-established case law

conﬁrms the “vested and

embodied within the Uniform Probate Code (UPC),
are the

owners—not ownership

this

Lemp

v.

appeal—as the

titled

statutory authority

and

owners” of Decedent’s property, as

the heirs and/or devisees 0f a Decedent; they

who,

as a matter

of law, cannot

own

assets.

Supreme Court has come

101 years, a personal representative cannot

in

is

this

to a personal representative,

any part of a Decedent’s property
Unless

an ejectment action, and to prevail on such

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 184

to

View the matter

“own any

P. 222, (1919),

differently than expressed the past

part of” a Decedent’s property, as

announced

Which principle remains pre-emptive

Appellant’s Reply Bn'ef
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t0

any

Rule 70(b) entry a magistrate
transferred

may

elect t0 restore a

Decedent’s property interest that had been

ﬁve years previously. That ownership goes exclusively

the estate or any ﬁduciary of the estate.

Once property

is

t0 the heirs,

by

statute,

not to

restored to a Decedent, the devolution

of the ownership immediately transfers to the heirs or devisees, pursuant t0 the Uniform Probate

Code (UPC) and case

law, never vested With any ﬁduciary 0f the estate.

In Hillen’s narration of Respondent’s “Nature of the Case”, Hillen asserts the lower court

ejected

Gibson from the “Gibson Property” (Respondent’s

property, the correct statement

heirs

would be

Gibson does not

the court ejected Gibson from the property

0f Decedent, as only heirs or devisees are the

entered Judgment on the Pleadings (Motion for
property”, a 520-acre holding

Brief, p. 1).

“titled

owned by

the

owners” of the property. The lower court

JOTP) and

owned by Decedent’s

own the real

ejected

heirs,

Gibson from the “Gowen Field

where Gibson has occupied and

possessed approximately 30 acres of that property continuously since August, 2004 producing

compost and humus intended

for use in

an agricultural operation 0f the

Hillen’s pleadings asserted Hillen

was

the

owner 0f

entire

520

acres.

that acreage, claiming “exclusive

ownership” by Virtue 0f the controversial Rule 70(b) entry by the magistrate 0n June

2,

2017, an

Instrument that remains Violative 0f both the statute and the established case law. Hillen describes
his “Nature

of the Case” in the following manner:

Gibson—but mostly

his attorney

Vernon—claims

the Estate, acting through

personal representative, Hillen, lacks the authority t0 eject an

its

unwanted party from

Estate-owned property. Cutting through Gibson/Vernon’s irrelevant and incorrect
facts and points, the disposition 0f this appeal amounts to a single issue: does Hillen
have the authority, as personal representative,

t0 eject

an unwanted party from

Estateproperzﬁy. (Emphasis added).

That was never the allegation Within Hillen’s pleadings. Hillen never asserted he sought to
“eject

an unwanted party from

exclusive titled

owner 0f

all

estate property”.

Hillen’s allegation

was

that Hillen

was

the

0f Decedent’s property, an element he had t0 allege t0 establish

Appellant’s Reply Bn'ef
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standing t0 eject someone. Hillen must establish “ownership” to establish a claim for ejectment.

Gibson has never been “an unwanted party” by
a

critical

beneﬁt

Decedent 0r the

either the

heirs, as

Gibson has been

and preservation since 2004.

to the property’s protection

This “idea” 0f a “personal representative having authority to eject an unwantedpartyfrom
Estate properly” has become Hillen’s

law supports
law. Hillen

property

his “ownership” theory,

is

new

approach, as he realizes neither the statute nor the case

and the 70(b) entry

is

clearly a contradiction t0 the controlling

Without ownership, he has n0 statutory standing to eject an occupant from the

owned by

heirs. Hillen, as

personal representative, has certain rights relative t0 needed

possession, but only t0 the extent expressed within the limitations and restrictions of the

articulated Within Appellant’s

Opening

Hillen alleged ownership,

ownership,

is

Brief,

knowing

and as reference

is

further

UPC,

as

made hereinafter.

the applicable law controlling such actions requires

faced With the statutory authority and case law that has placed ownership 0f

Decedent’s property with the heirs or devisees, never a personal representative. T0 get what Hillen
sought, Hillen needed to turn to the erroneously

the Rule 70(b) entry,

worded and over—reaching Instrument identiﬁed

Which unlawfully placed “ownership” With

as

Hillen, not the heirs as required.

Hillen realizes this conundrum, and has strayed from “ownership” as discussed in this

segment of his
disposition

Brief,

no longer relying on

0f this appeal amounts

representative, t0 eject

t0

his earlier posture that “I

a single

issue:

own it”,

t0

now postulating

does Hillen have the authority, as personal

an unwantedpartjyfrom Estate properly

That was not his allegation in his

pleadings he sought and obtained a judgment upon, and that “phraseology”
required in an ejectment action. This

lower court, and not the issue in

new

this appeal.

“the

is

not the element

concept was not advocated in Hillen’s brieﬁng t0 the

Gibson was never alleged

Appellant’s Reply Bn'ef
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to

be “an unwanted party

[t0

be

ej ected

from] estate property”, as he has been a very beneﬁcial occupant on the property pursuant

t0 the venture

agreement established in 2004.

If Hillen has

own

now acknowledged he

is

not the “owner” of the property, realizing the heirs

a Decedent’s property, then his ejectment action must

element for such an action. Only Hillen

is

0n record wanting

fail,

as “ownership”

is

to eliminate Gibson, as

the critical

he has never

been deemed “an unwanted party”. Neither the Decedent, during any 0f the nine years preceding
Victoria’s death, nor through Vernon, nor anyone of interest in the property, has ever regarded

Gibson

t0

be other than a valuable asset and a

agreement.

N0

heir has ever

gone on record

beneﬁt t0 the property under the joint venture

Vital

to say

Gibson

is

“an unwanted party”, as Gibson

preserved the property and produced approximately 350,000 cu. yds 0f compost and humus, for

development of the planned agricultural operation 0n the 520
asset

and beneﬁt

t0 Victoria

acres.

and Vernon, before her death, and

Gibson has always been a huge

clearly to the heirs’

beneﬁt since her

death, protecting the property.

Hillen sought to liquidate the property, without demonstrating any necessity under the
statute to take possession

estate

and

all

federal taxes

from the

were

heirs,

and Hillen

is

well aware there were n0 creditors in the

paid.

Hillen must realize he continues to act outside the

UPC

and

in contradiction

of well-

established case law, and evolving from his arrogant assertion of “exclusive property ownership”,

even t0 the exclusion of an
eject

an unwanted party

heir, t0 a

ﬁom

new theory that

Estate property”. That does not satisfy the element t0 prevail

ejectment claim long recognized in the law. (See
Investments,

a personal representative has the authority “t0

Ada County Highway

LLC,145 Idaho 360, 369,179 P.3d 323,332

Appellant’s Reply Bn'ef

(2008));

P.

7

Pro

Dist.

v.

on an

Total Success

Indiviso, Inc. v

Mid—Mile

Holding

Trust, 131

P.2d 158 (1950).

Idaho 741, 745, 963 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1998); Petty v Petty, 70 Idaho 473, 223

An ejectment claim requires Plaintiff t0 allege and prove ownership.

Has Hillen even alleged

the

Gowen

heirs are the owners, not the estate. Hillen

Field property t0 be an “Estate

had

owned property”? The

ownership or he has no standing t0 even

t0 allege

bring an ejectment action. Gibson has been a cherished and valuable asset t0 the property, never

regarded to be “an unwanted party”. Hillen could only pursue an

and prove “ownership” of the property, as

that

is

ej ectment

action if he could allege

fundamental under the law for an

ej ectment action.

Thus, Hillen claimed ownership t0 the property, by asserting the validity 0f the Rule 70(b) entry by
the magistrate

0f any

0n June

2,

2017, giving him exclusive

titled

owner, and he claimed t0 the exclusion

heir.

Consequently, this appeal hovers around the Rule 70(b) entry, the Instrument Hillen relied

upon, and what Hillen championed his entire proposition t0 the lower court to secure his Judgment
for

ej ectment.

This appeal directly challenges Hillen’s wrongful use 0f that Instrument, and the invalidity

0f that Instrument for the purpose Hillen has employed
cannot be the

“titled

“ownership” theory,

an

estate, as

Hillen

is

application, as Hillen, as a matter

0f law,

“owner” of Decedent’s property, and the lower court cannot embrace an

if Hillen is

deemed to be

such a ﬁduciary cannot

restricted to

its

own

“acting” in the capacity as a personal representative of

the property, and the estate does not

and limited by the provisions of the

UPC

as to the exercise

own

the property.

0f any right t0 take

possession 0f property, expressly limited to speciﬁc circumstances, none of which exist here. The

have a “necessity” for a need

t0 take possession for

the satisfaction 0f creditors and other interested persons, and that did not exist

When Hillen ﬁled this

limitations require a personal representative t0

ej ectment

action.

Appellant’s Reply Bn'ef
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By

statute, if a

ﬁduciary wants t0 take possession 0f an heirs’ property interest in the needed

administration 0f the estate, he needs t0

interests,

show a

and absent such, the property remains

Decedent. The

UPC requires

necessity t0 for satisfaction of creditors and other

titled to

and vested With the heirs 0r devisees 0f the

a personal representative to resolve valid and approved creditor claims

Within the administration of the estate, and in this estate, there has never been any creditor claims or

to require liquidation

0f an

When there

are

no

asset, there exists

no

unsettled interests to address.

ﬁle an ejectment action, and Hillen cannot

Instrument that violates the

statute,

statute t0 disrupt the devolution

For Hillen t0
authority to eject an

tell

creditor claims

become

the “exclusive titled

owner” by relying upon an

case law, and void for lack ofjurisdictional authority under the

0f a Decedent’s property

interests.

us the “single issue” t0 be decided in this appeal

“unwanted patty from

Has Hillen abandoned

in the estate

statutory authority for a personal representative t0

estate property”, is not

misses the element of ownership, as neither Hillen nor the Estate
his claim to the “exclusive titled

characterizing his claim t0 be something different than

Is

and no interested party

is

what he

Whether he has the

alleged,

and

entirely

own the property.

ownership” of the property, and

now

What his Pleadings represent?

Hillen converting his action from one 0f ejectment through his alleged “ownership of the

property” to an action instead based upon a claim to “eject an unwanted party from Estate

property”?

Where

is

the issue 0f ownership?

He

cannot say the estate owns the property, because

does not—the heirs are the owners of Decedent’s property

interests.

it

An heir would need to bring the

ejectment action, as the Estate has no ownership interest, and the estate has no creditor claim 0r tax

liability for

a personal representative t0 undertake to satisfy. Until Hillen churns

cash corpus, there

is

ample funds from the

sale

of Hamer, Idaho property.

Appellant’s Reply Bn'ef
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away the remaining

Neither a magistrate, nor a lower court, has the authority to abrogate the limitations the
legislature has

adopted upon the enactment of the Uniform Probate Code, or seek to modify the

plain reading and

meaning of the

Because Hillen

is

statutory provisions as t0 the ownership

not the owner of the property, Hillen has no standing to engage an

ejectment action in the lower district court. If Hillen

abandoned such a claim

that

he

remand the matter

n0 longer advocating ownership, and has

is

the “exclusive titled

is

required to vacate the judgment and

owner” 0f the property, then

for dismissal as a matter

element 0f “ownership” associated with Hillen’s suggestion Gibson
property”, and that he, as a personal representative,

element 0f ownership
ownership, there

is

is

of Decedent’s property.

may

eject

is

t0 support

Court

0f law? There

is

n0

“an unwanted party 0n Estate

him from

“estate” property,

missing from that perceived situation. Without the

n0 ownership element

is this

When the

titled interest to assert

an ejectment action, and Hillen could only g0

t0 the magistrate t0 argue necessity to take possession for a statutory recognized reason, his only

ﬁduciary avenue t0 follow, but instead he forum shops, using an Instrument crafted by a magistrate
that

exceeded any statutory authority and bypassed

all

due process requirements

in

an

effort

intended to restore Decedent’s ownership, and t0 the exclusion of others, but void as t0 any
exclusion pertaining t0 the statutory devolution mandated by the provisions of the
to

UPC, Where

title

Decedent’s property immediately vests With the Heirs or devisees of Decedent. This being an

Intestate Estate, the heirs are the vested

with

title

t0 Decedent’s property,

and no heir has sought the

ejectment 0f Gibson under any theory, as he has been a tremendous asset for the beneﬁt 0f the
property.

Is Hillen’s

version within the “Nature of the Case”,

claim t0 “exclusive

titled

is

a transformation of his action from his

ownership” t0 a claim he has “a right t0 eject an unwanted party from

Estate property” (See Respondent’s Brief, p.1-2), then

is

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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an admission he cannot prove the

element for an ejectment, and the judgment must be vacated for lack 0f the required element 0f

ownership

,

and the matter remanded for dismissal? There

ownership by the

estate,

and

He

representing an owner.

is

Hillen, representing the estate as

n0
its

statutory authority t0 establish

personal representative,

is

not

cannot prevail in a request for possession under the statute without a

necessity to resolve a creditor claim or debt of the Estate.

Hillen

is

not suing on behalf 0f any owner, and Hillen was not suing on behalf 0f any heir,

rather claiming ownership

Hillen has

an

ej ectment

action

that Instrument is

ej ectment

now

void for use he has sought t0 use

judgment, as ownership

That

is

upon

t0

make

that

vacated, and the matter

fundamental issue,

Which case

remanded With

element and proof of ownership, an

new

2,

2017, but

if

then the lower court cannot grant Hillen an

such an action, and

his allegation. Is this

his claim to ownership, in

Hillen’s

t0

it,

him on June

it

does matter.

relief

under the ejectment

appeal has been presented upon the allegations from which the ejectment

judgment was granted. T0 address

abandoned

ﬁmdamental

the magistrate gave

walked away from “ownership”, there can be n0

said, this

that Hillen relied

entry.

found himself in the midst 0f the conundrum he alone has created, pursuing

upon the ownership he contends

If Hillen has

action.

by Virtue 0f the Rule 70(b)

still

it is

essential to address the Instrument

the focus 0f this appeal, 0r has Hillen

that should cause the certiﬁed

instruction t0 dismiss the

ej ectment

ej ectment

judgment

to

be

action, as without the

action cannot be allowed t0 prevail.

concept that he has a right t0

ej ect

an unwanted party from estate property was

never raised below, and not within the ejectment action Hillen ﬁled in the lower court. The theory

was “exclusive

titled

ownership”, the element he needed t0 allege and prove, never claiming Gibson

“an unwanted party” and needed t0 be removed from “Estate property”. If
then where

is

the element 0f ownership?

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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it

be his new concept,

To

Hillen’s

unwanted party”?

Gowen
not be

new theory—When was

When

the

and by

was

dumping grounds addressed

2004 and

it

determined Gibson was “an

protecting and preserving the integrity of the property so as

in the

tenure as a venture participant with Victoria and

service since

Whom was

did Gibson’s critical and Vital beneﬁt as an occupant of a portion 0f the

Field property, where he

among

it,

to the heirs since 2013,

Opening Brief become unwanted? Gibson’s

Vernon served a very beneﬁcial purpose and

and for the

entire period

of his 16-year presence,

with the approval, consent, and pursuant t0 the joint venture arrangement between Victoria, Vernon

and Gibson
this

t0 the present.

The record before

conversion from Hillen’s “vested and

this court

titled

does not provide any factual basis t0

make

ownership” to Hillen’s “right t0 eject an unwanted

party from Estate property”. Unless Hillen has abandoned the claim t0 the “exclusive titled

ownership” 0f the

a.

Gowen Field property the

following issues 0n appeal remain:

Whether, in the absence 0f any established need for the liquidation 0f assets in
the administration 0f an estate, as determined under I.C. §15-3-711, does a
personal representative have any authority within the general provisions 0f the

Idaho Uniform Probate Code, LC. §15-1-101
participant (Gibson)

b.

c.

from

et seq.

(UPC), to eject a venture
of property that by

his otherwise lawful possession

law (LC. §15-3-101) is vested in the heirs 0f the Estate?
Under the UPC, can a personal representative ever "own" estate property, as
opposed to taking and holding "possession" of property in trust for the beneﬁt
of creditors in satisfaction of their claims?
Does a magistrate, in a probate proceeding, have any authority t0 transfer
"ownership" 0f property to a personal representative by means of a Rule 70(b),
I.R.C.P. order?

d.

Does

the "conclusive evidence" standard

a personal representative's pleading,

announced

made upon

in

LC. §15-3-709 apply

alleged "ownership"

t0

of

property, as opposed to a pleading t0 obtain "possession" of property, for
satisfaction

of creditor claims as a estate necessity, t0 which the "conclusive

evidence" standard was intended t0 apply under that section?
e.

Was

the lower court’s October 3,

upon a speciﬁc ﬁnding

of Decedent’s property — as a direct consequence of the entry
of the Rule 70(b) Order?
Alternatively, did this Court’s decision constitute a direct repudiation and
denial of Hillen’s claim t0 be the “sole owner” 0f Decedent’s property as a

property

f.

result

— and

2019 Amended Memorandum decision based
owner of the Gowen Field

that Hillen is the sole

all

0f the Rule 70(b) Order 0n the basis
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Court has instead declared

Hillen to have the “same power” as that 0f an absolute owner under LC. § 153-71 1, as being necessary to permit Him to eject Gibson from the Gowen Field

property?
g.

deemed to be the sole owner of Decedent’s property, as a
consequence of the Rule 70(b) Order, then on What basis does Hillen remain
subject to the statutorily-stated trust obligations he owes to Decedent’s heir
whose interest has been allegedly divested as result 0f the entry 0f the Rule
If Hillen is

70(b) Order?
h.

is deemed t0 be the sole owner of Decedent’s property as a
consequence of the Rule 70(b) Order, then 0n what basis does the “divested”
heir, Vernon K. Smith, retain standing to challenge or seek restraint 0f the

If Hillen

unauthorized actions attempted by Hillen to
clear

an

ej ectment

claim,

for ejectment,

was “ownership”, vested

Going from “exclusive ownership”
estate property”

the heirs’ property Without a

showing 0f necessity which becomes a factual dispute?

The theory Hillen advocated
for

sell

in

knowing need

t0 allege

an essential element

him by Virtue of the Rule 70(b)

t0 instead a right to eject

Entry.

“an unwanted party from

does not satisfy the element 0f an ejectment action. Hillen has a propensity t0

misrepresent facts in the probate proceedings (fabrications about social security beneﬁts, credit
card usage, farm equipment, tax

liabilities, irrigation obstructions,

DEQ regulations, just t0 name

a few), and such distortions serve to mislead this court to curry bias that should never exist.
Hillen reveals his unsavory propensity within commentary expressed Within Respondent’s

“course 0f proceedings” below.

B. Replv

T0 Respondent’s “Course

0f Proceedings_”

Hillen strays from the record to advocate a false perception regarding the Decedent’s

holographic will and the transfers.

when

referencing the Estate Case. Hillen presents his false

commentary, highlighted Within the following:
After Victoria’s death, Judge Copsey, Who is presiding over Victoria’s estate case
(the “Estate Case”): (1) invalidated Victoria’s will—draﬂed by Vernon—as the

product 0f undue inﬂuence; and (2) set aside series of transactions by which Vernon
transferred all 0f Victoria’s property t0 himself 0r entities controlled by him. Id. at
465-66, 432 P.3d

at

14-15. After issuing these rulings, Judge

Copsey appointed

Hillen as personal representative 0f the Estate, and entered judgment, pursuant to

Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 70(b), which, for present purposes, vested
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title

t0 the

Gibson Property in Hillen. (R. 131 1). That Judgment
70 Judgment”. (Highlighted emphasis added)

Vernon did not

is

referred t0 here as the “Rule

Mother’s Will; the transfers were conducted as his Mother

draft his

requested and as she directed over months 0f discussion. Hillen’s statement “for present purposes,
vested

upon

title

to the

to Hillen”,

is

reference t0 the 70(b) entry Hillen continues to rely

for his claimed ownership, the culmination 0f his

Why
Will,

Gibson Property

Hillen falsely states

Vernon drafted

by deﬁnition he advocates an oxymoron,

misguided perceptions.

his Mother’s Will,

as

it

was

When

it

was a Holographic

Victoria’s personal expressions, not

Vernon’s, and then t0 broadcast such a false statement he, as an attorney, knows

true,

is

not factually

only epitomizes Hillen’s displeasure with Vernon’s disappointment 0f Hillen’s repeated

contemptuous behavior throughout the administration of his Mother’s Estate.

Vernon never “drafted”
after

it

was

executed.

From

Victoria’s Holographic Will, let alone discussed

when

1966,

Victoria’s

husband

its

content until

died, until 1978, Victoria

had three

attorneys at her beck and call, Willis Sullivan, Joe Imhoff, and Jess Hawley, three attorneys

involved in her late husband’s Estate and representing her interests for 12 years (1966-1978), and
she had a “belly-full” of attorneys and their “legalese”, herself having been married to a brilliant
attorney for 28 years, ending With his death in 1966.

After 12 years, Willis Sullivan and Victoria decided t0 substitute his involvement in her

deceased husband’s Estate with Victoria’s son, Vernon, having become an attorney in 1971.
Hillen’s bad-faith

comment

that

Vernon

drafted Victoria’s Will deserves response and a

rebuke for his misbehavior and deliberate misstatement. Victoria drafted the only Will she ever
executed, her

own

Holographic Will, created and signed by her on February 14, 1990. Vernon was

never asked about any testamentary matters by his Mother, having had 12 years 0f any needed
discussion With three attorneys.

Vernon was never asked
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Mother 0n how she should

articulate her

own

holographic expressions. Victoria utilized a Holographic Will formation just as

her husband did, and as she had three attorneys elaborate about probate matters. Victoria
her Will

was “her”

right she exercised

intentions, written out in her

and expressed

in her

clear

hand-writing, a right she possessed and the

own way.

Victoria had the right to draft her

a holographic process to formulate his

own

made

own Holographic

own

will.

Was

it

Will, just as her

wrong

for either

husband had used such

0f them t0 exercise that

choice? Does any person, even a probate judge, have a right t0 invalid their Wishes and expressed
intentions

embodied

in their

own

hand-written testament—or d0

we now

see that might

be the case? What a surprise has been bestowed upon Victoria, a strong-Willed
could talk

down

0r run—off a grizzly bear, yet a court

some undue inﬂuence! What has happened to change
expression

known

apparently not

t0 the generations

some

judges.

What

New

would conclude her Wishes were

n0 longer

Yorker

who

the result 0f

these long-held and historic rights of personal

of yesteryear? The

statute

ﬁrmly embraces such process, but

a disappointment Victon'a would express to hear that a court,

With no personal knowledge and choosing to ignore testimony, would undermine a testator’s
desires,

and declare such cherished and long-held self—expressed intentions

effectively causing precisely

What the

Mother would ﬁnd a court

to reject her hand-written intentions

benefactor

now shares

Even

in

testator

never wanted t0 occur.

t0

How

and see

be disregarded, and
is it

that

possible such a

an unintended

What he declined to preserve?

Victoria Converse (Vicky), the Decedent’s daughter, has expressed in emails her

disappointment over

this gross injustice,

well aware her Mother intended t0 exclude a daughter and

a son, for reasons they both knew, only t0 see her Mother’s right 0f choice has been denied, an
expression she reﬂected in her Holographic Will over two decades before she died, revealing in
writing her unyielding intentions. Hillen

is

fully

aware 0f Vicky’s factual disclosures of
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this

injustice,

and

is

aware of Vicky’s disgust With the judicial system, and the behavior 0f Hillen.

Is

Hillen to belittle Vicky also?
Hillen’s narratives continue in spite of Vicky’s emails berating Hillen’s behavior, as Hillen

wasn’t around in 2012 to

Vernon

“transferred

(Respondent’s Brief,

listen to

all

p. 2).

What Victoria wanted and

instructed

0f Victoria’s property to himself 0r

Vernon formed the

limited liability

Vernon

entities

company,

to d0.

Hillen says

controlled

VHS

by him”

Properties,

LLC,

at

his Mother’s request, using her initials, t0 speciﬁcally trace the property transfers, With joint interest

t0 reﬂect

Vernon’s decades 0f ﬁnancial/personal contributions, and effectuating her decision that

Vernon take ownership, contemplated by her long-held

intentions, expressed

by her

intentions

within her Holographic Will she created over two decades before on Valentine’s day in 1990. There

was nothing

nefarious

by these

transfers, as

it

was what Victoria requested and had wanted t0

occur,

and consistent with her expressed objectives for decades. consistent With the way she envisioned
devolution, and the involvement

was

like

Vicky has disclosed

to Hillen in her emails, “they

were a

team”, from the passing of her husband and Vernon’s Father in 1966, a period over 47 years, they
acted together, apparently something Hillen cannot understand.

This propensity 0f Hillen to portray events about which he has n0
recite, is part

facts,

not even a record t0

of what promotes the controversial environment over Vernon disappointment of

Hillen’s conduct While acting as the personal representative in his Mother’s estate, with Hillen

fueling discord

by his substandard behavior.

Since Hillen recites speculation, a few facts are in order. Victoria’s Holographic Will was

crafted

by Victoria on Valentine’s

expressions 0f her intentions, later

day, February 14, 1990, the day she chose t0 hand-write he

conﬁrmed

it

was her symbolic way 0f choosing

express, in writing, her intentions relating to her children, reﬂecting
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that

upon her commitment

day

t0

t0 one,

but not

all,

for her

own reasons. She gave t0

each previously, but speciﬁcally cherished one son

who

provided his devotion and commitment t0 protect her and preserve her interests for those decades
following the death of her husband in 1966.

with her
t0

own tenacious and

commit

t0 writing

decades, a fact

What had been her long-held

known

to each

heir, as

Joseph,

Who

Vicky
his

t0

make, knowing her children, and

intentions watching

What had progressed over the

of her children. Hillen has received the emails written by Vicky,

Who

discussing their dis—inheritance

from an

was her decision

stubborn disposition, elected t0 d0 what she did on that Valentine’s day,

residing in Portland, Oregon,

facts

It

by

has revealed her discussions with Joseph that took place in 1992

their

Mother, and their discussions as t0 Why. Hillen knows these

sent her emails to Hillen

Mother would say had

and Hillen’s attorneys.

less than

a casual acquaintance With the truth,

deceived the court by saying he was u_naware 0f his exclusion, though discussed in 1990 0n two

known

occasions and later with Vicky again in 1992, having

well aware there was no inﬂuence, a fact Vicky

was

Victoria’s salvation, for

Vicky was very

which

detailed in her revelations t0 Hillen,

access, yet Hillen declines to recite

an

clear t0 Hillen

loyalty Victoria’s appreciation

Vicky’s emails, also reﬂected in responding

in

made

for over

what an

letters

two decades

and

his attorneys as

Vernon

and devotion was unyielding.

conﬁrming Joseph’s character

Victoria wrote to Joseph,

heir (Vicky)

his exclusion,

knows and

all

in

0f Which Hillen had

says, expressly being

conveyed

effort t0 correct this injustice.

Instead, because

0f Vernon’s criticism 0f Hillen’s gross misconduct, Hillen would rather

perpetuate and broadcast a false narrative to portray negative perceptions to the court, petty

retaliation

because of Vernon’s disappointment with Hillen’s behavior and destruction 0f the

property interests Vernon has spent his entire adult

life

protecting and saving.

Appellant’s Reply Brief

P. 17

Vicky explained

to Hillen that

Vernon had n0 reason or need

instead behaving as an obedient and loyal son, the attributes every

For that loyalty and devotion, Vernon

him

to

that Hillen has not

own

children and decide

upon

been a cherished son? Hillen needs

the magistrate forgot to embrace,

Victoria had created her

openly to Carolyn for

own

who knew

salvation.

Whom

reward a Mother wanted

Does not a Mother have a

she shall bestow What? Could

to read the testimony

right

it

be

0f Carolyn Puckett,

Victoria long before, during, and long after

many years throughout their relationship.
and read Vicky’s emails, should take heed 0f Vicky’s

driven by her tenacity and stubbornness t0 reveal the truth, a character

by from her Mother, and
and

in a son.

holographic Will, frequently expressing t0 her Victoria’s intentions

Hillen, having received

intentions,

inﬂuence his Mother,

Mother would Cherish

for reaping the righteous

have for his decades of funding, preservation and

to praise or criticize her

who

is criticized

to

it

was Vicky’s assumed duty

t0 restore within her capability

been made aware, and

she so righteously

came

Mother’s well-known

t0 respect her

what Victoria sought

t0 demonstrate her true sincerity,

trait

integrity,

to achieve, a fact that Hillen has

Vicky assigned her

Vernon, her contribution to restore the destruction taking place by

Intestate interest to

this injustice

committed upon

her Mother’s most personal and heartfelt Holographic Will.

For Hillen

to maliciously state

Vernon “drafted”

his Mother’s Holographic Will, having

read Vicky’s emails, and aware 0f the testimony of Carolyn Puckett, Hillen
falsehood, but perpetrates an

Will

is

deﬁnition, being an attorney, he

not only embracing a

knows a Holographic

a document speciﬁcally drafted by the testator, not a third party.

With

now

oxymoron by

is

the destruction of Victoria’s expressed intentions maintained for over

are t0 endure Hillen’s imprudent

Holographic Will, and did nefarious

cements,

transfers, but

two decades, we

not just that Vernon “drafted” his Mother’s

now

the factually baseless and newest
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comment

that

Gibson was “an unwanted party” and

t0

be ejected from “Estate property”, more 0f Hillen’s

disappointing behavior, for which he deserves t0 be ridiculed. This type 0f commentary only serves

to

add

to the

representative,

disenchantment that demonstrates that Hillen

and simply needs

to

is

truly not suited t0

be a personal

be removed 0r replaced.

Neither Joseph nor Hillen were around t0 see, be involved With, ﬁnance, protect, 0r preserve
anything, and Hillen appears inclined to defeat and destroy everything that

stood

for,

Vernon and Victoria

wanting t0 liquidate what they spend nearly a half century protecting and preserving, with

neither a necessity 0r a legitimate purpose t0 continue liquidating, and perceived t0 be in total

dereliction

of Hillen’s ﬁduciary

responsibilities, his limited authority

and the

relating t0 liquidating property interests, deliberately destroying the interests

statutory restrictions

of the 2/3rds heir of the

Decedent.
Hillen

knows

these property assets were ﬁnanced,

ﬁmded, protected, and preserved by

Vernon, and without one penny from Joseph, and with no estate creditors to confront or
disbursements from this estate
for needless

actually

approaching $2 million taken by Hillen and his cadre 0f attorneys

and wasteﬁJI “administrative fees and expenses”, the reason

liquidate unique property for

taxation for

is

no beneﬁt

to

no reason but

an

heir, relying

afﬁnned the Rule 70(b)

satisfy, the

t0 Churn fees,

which Hillen seeks

and in the process creating

upon another challenged

entry, the basis

for

belief this

capital gains

Supreme Court

upon which Hillen claims ownership,

as

stated in the Respondent’s Brief:

“Vernon appealed the invalidation 0f the Will, the decision to set aside the property
transfers, and the Rule 70 Judgment. Matter ofEstate omeith, supra. As part of that
appeal, this Court considered “any matters occurring up t0 and including the post-trial
judgment under Rule 70(b).”

Id.

at

466, 432 P.3d at

15

(2018).

After such

consideration, this Court concluded that “the decisions of the magistrate court are

afﬁrmed.”

Id. at

482, 432 P.3d at 3 1. (Emphasis added)
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t0

he has

No

party appealed the Rule 70(b) entry, and this court did not rule

upon

invalidity

its

and

void status 0r the enforceability 0f that Instrument, Which arguably was entered in Violation of the

and case law. Hillen

statute

relies entirely

upon

2017, the sole basis for his “ownership”, and

by

this

Supreme Court,

the effect 0f

this

now

Rule 70(b) entry by the magistrate on June

arguing that entry was addressed

Which “vested exclusive ownership”

in

2,

and affirmed

him under

the Rule

70(b) entry, afﬁrmed in the Supreme Court Decision, establishing ownership of Decedent’s

property interests With him, as the personal representative, something that neither the statute
permits, nor the well-established case law

It is

entry,

would support 0r

because of this unsubstantiated proposition

and embrace the only intended purpose

statute

and case law? Or was

it

allow.

this court

was designed

must address What the Rule 70(b)

t0 accomplish.

Was

it

t0 Violate the

a poorly informed magistrate’s attempt t0 restore Decedent’s

it

ownership to property, from which the statutory scheme 0f devolution would transfer the statutory
ownership from there, in accordance with the Uniform Probate Code?

The only purpose 0f

previously transferred t0

interests,

Victoria H. Smith, Who,

interests

the Rule 70(b) entry

would be

the heirs.

by

VHS

Properties,

The poorly conceived

statute

to re-transfer Decedent’s property

on July

4,

2012, back t0 the Grantor,

Uniform Probate Code took

crafting 0f the Instrument transferred

interests, as

over,

and the

under the adopted statutory scheme of devolution to

Hillen, suggesting the magistrate did not

Decedent’s property

LLC

then, being deceased, the

statutorily transferred

was

have knowledge of the

such Rule 70(b) entry

is

P.

of the property t0

vestimre mandates of

expressly in contradiction t0 the

and case law.
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Hillen has chosen to fashion his authority from this statutorily unauthorized creativity,

and engage

in a statutorily inconsistent assertion

he IS the

“titled

owner” 0f Decedent’s

because of the language contained Within the Rule 70(b) entry on June

2,

assets

2017.

Hillen has ﬁled four separate actions in district court, With the use of this Rule 70(b)

entry,

and

appeal being the ﬁrst such action. Not only

this

similar actions based

on the

statutorily inconsistent

is this

action and each of the other

Rule 70(b) entry, but

we ﬁnd

‘forum shopping’ these ejectment complaints outside of the probate court, with

Hillen

Whom

it

is

was

thought the Supreme Court had placed exclusive iurisdiction With the magistrate court over the
estate

and the

heirs’ interests.

C. Relief Appellant Requests Regarding The Rule 70(b) Entrv
It is

essential, to prevent further

Supreme Court

proceedings from becoming complicated further, for this

t0 address the erroneous vesture

ﬂawed Rule

personal representative by the

Decedent’s assets are only
statutorily required,

titled

0f title/ownership 0f Decedent’s assets in the

70(b) entry. The statute and case law declares a

With the heirs of the Decadent, Where

Decedent’s assets. See

Lemp

conﬁrmation

representative’s

has always been

even long before the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code.

been with a Personal Representative, who, according

Such

title

authority

v.

of

statutory

and

case

law

0f

administration,

but

does

is

has never

t0 long-established law, cannot

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

representative’s administrative authority

It

P. 222,

does
serve

own

a

223 (1919).

not

to

Violate

conﬁrm

the

personal

a

personal

limited and restricted t0 the statutory requirements

mandated within the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) and case law.
It

would

also require the personal representative t0

go before the probate court

t0

consider issues relating t0 sale and possessory rights over properties, and the preferred in-kind
distribution thereof,

and not allow a personal representative
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district court

where the commencement 0f ej ectment actions does not address probate

but only 100k to the elements in an ejectment action, the ﬁrst of Which

—ownership—is

focus of the district court, not the issue in a probate proceeding where necessity

what

creditor claims exist t0 be satisﬁed. This

is

went

the very reason Hillen

was thought

restraints,

is

the

the issue and

t0 the district court

and by-passed the probate court

that

the relevant aspects under the

Uniform Probate Code. The personal representative has the

statutory obligation to

comply with

the

UPC

t0

have the exclusive jurisdiction t0 address

and be consistent with the application 0f due

process and statutory mandates and case law.

D.

What Has Been The

Unintended Consequence

0f The Rule 70

(b)

Entrv

This ruling, as currently reﬂected in the Order/Judgment entered by the magistrate on

June

2,

2017, created an unauthorized disposition Decedent’s property t0 erroneously become

owned by

the personal representative 0f the estate.

objectives of the

Hillen’s current use of this entry deﬁes the

Uniform Probate Code, ignoring necessity

t0 take possession

of property, the

need for creditor claims and unsatisﬁed debt, and ignoring the preferred in-kind distribution of
assets

among

the heirs,

who

hold the vested and

titled

ownership

interest

of Decedent’s

property.

This disregard has enabled Hillen t0 act freely to wrongfully liquidate the property
interests entirely,

when

the statute and case law declares the heirs to be the vested owners, and

Hillen’s behavior has been contrary t0 the obj ectives of the

that heir has

always sought t0 preserve

Hillen

is

a

assets, not liquidate

UPC

and

that

0f the 2/3rds

heir, as

them.

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, what appears to be his professional

experience, and in that capacity, pursues liquidation 0f assets, and
the creditors in a Bankruptcy Estate.

vastly different; in this Estate there

The obligation 0f Hillen,

were n0

creditors,

and the
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who

acts entirely

on behalf of

as a personal representative, are

interests

0f the rights and desires

of the heirs must be considered, and the duty must be t0 preserve assets for the
Hillen, acting

upon

this perception

heirs.

of his unfettered ownership, has caused four

actions t0 be ﬁled in district court, three of

Which

are

on appeal

to the

civil

Idaho Supreme Court,

with a fourth awaiting further proceedings. These actions exist only because of the erroneous

placement of title With Hillen, Which vesture under the Instrument must be declared invalid and
void.

Otherwise, vesting

title

in this

manner conﬂicts with

authority t0 effectuate the provisions of the

UPC, which

the statutory and jurisdictional

must be held

statutory authority

to

control property ownership.

The Rule 70(b) entry

is

in direct Violation

of existing case law, vesting ownership 0f a

decedent’s property in a personal representative violates case law (Lemp, supra),
act solely in the capacity as a ﬁduciary, holds

n0 ownership

such must act as a trustee within the provisions,

The

Who can

in the Decedent’s property,

only

and as

and limitations of the UPC.

restrictions,

authority, pursuant t0 the administration of an estate

by a personal

representative,

is

limited to possession of such assets only under certain limited circumstances of necessity t0

satisfy, in trust,

any existing creditor claims. There were n0

Vernon resolved

all

debts, liabilities,

creditors’ claims in this estate, as

and potential claims of both

his Father

and

his

Mother

long before the death of Decedent. The only obligation came to be the federal taxing authority

and the administrative expenses generated by Hillen and

was resolved previously,
E.

of attorneys. The tax

liability

prior t0 the present liquidation efforts.

What Was The Intended Consequence Of The Rule 70(b) Entrv
This magistrate declared the transfers to

Victoria H. Smith’s assets under the 2008
to

his cadre

VHS

Properties,

LLC

on July

outside the authority 0f the

4,

VHS

Properties,

LLC

Power of Attorney, being

an act of “gifting” 0f

the transfers from Victoria

2012, and the magistrate declared such a gifting act t0 be

power 0f attorney and

invalid.
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the

was

disposition that the 1990 Holographic Will 0f Victoria H. Smith

controversial claim of undue inﬂuence.

also invalid

upon

the

Those rulings were upheld 0n appeal.

After those rulings, 0n June 2, 2017, the magistrate should have simply reversed the July
4,

2012

transfer

0f Decedent’s property and restored the ownership t0 Decedent, allowing the

devolution t0 proceed under the

UPC,

unaware 0f the

magistrate, apparently

since Victoria had died

owner 0f Decedent’s property,

personal representative

,

but,

11,

2013. The

statutory declarations, entered her Instrument so as t0

transfer ownership 0f Decedent’s property t0 Hillen,

the

on September

and

that act served to

by law, only has authority

acting in a ﬁduciary capacity, and

make

Hillen appear

0f a

in the capacity as that

bound by

the terms 0f the

UPC.

That ill-worded and poorly crafted transfer was contrary t0 the statute (LC. §15—3-101)

and the well-established case law (Lemp, Fairchild, and

Ellmaker, supra, ignoring the

controlling authority that prohibits any person in a ﬁduciary capacity to take

Decedent’s property

interests, limited

In

Opening Brief and addressed hereinafter

open court

in a supplemental

70(b) entry, acknowledged she was not familiar With the law as

Although

after the Instrument

this issue

a

was

it

is

identiﬁed in

manner.

Who

in 2017, during a hearing before the magistrate

though stated two months

t0

only t0 seek possession t0 satisfy valid and approved

claims of a creditor and other interested persons, the authority regarding Which
detail in the

title

crafted that Rule

relates t0 probate matters,

entered.

has been brought to the attention of the magistrate, the scope of that

Order has never corrected, and a request

to

do so has been denied, leaving

Instrument to be addressed by this Supreme Court to announce

“ownership” regarding Decedent’s property, as ownership

its

this

lawless

invalidity as to the rights of

is statutorily

determined, and cannot

be undermined, degraded or disregarded, yet the entry has been misused misinterpreted,
misconstrued and abused by Hillen, and

Nowhere

in In re Estate

left t0

ﬂounder by the magistrate

omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d

6,

court.

(Idaho 2018), did the court

disregard the statute and well-established Idaho law that heirs, not a ﬁduciary,
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become

the

vested and titled owners of Decedent’s assets, immediately upon death, and nothing within the

Supreme Court Opinion
the estate 0r

either

afﬁrmed 0r placed ownership 0f the property

interests

any personal representative, and nothing was argued, 0r decided

that

with either

would

alter

the statutory provisions that placed ownership with the heirs, and the statutory provisions that

allowed the personal representative possession
administration,
statutory

When

power

t0

0f the heirs

interests

only,

during

the

the personal representative has established a necessity t0 exercise the

obtain possession, for the satisfaction 0f creditors 0r other interested

persons. Otherwise ownership remains with the heirs and distributed t0 the heirs through an in-

kind distribution, Whenever possible.

Vernon, being a 2/3““ heir of Decedent, retains 2/3rds ownership, as the probate
currently structured.

There are n0 creditors.

None of

the heirs are perceived to beneﬁt

is

by

Hillen’s desire t0 liquidate assets, as doing such only creates capital gains taxation, as there are

no

creditors to address an outstanding interest. If an heir

interest, after closure,

then so be

it,

but that

is

wants

t0 sell

an in—kind distributed

a decision for the heir, not Hillen. This irrational

conduct With depriving an heir of real property that by law

and cannot be replaced, needlessly exposes heirs

is

declared t0 be unique by nature,

to capital gains tax they desire not to incur,

caused from the liquidation of assets that should never be sold. Vernon has spent his lifetime
preserving and maintaining these real property assets, unique and cannot be replaced, and

Gibson has been a tremendous assistance With preserving and protecting the Gowen Field
property, While Joseph has done nothing but to request partition of certain assets.

F. Applicable Statutorv Authoritv

And Case Law On Propertv Ownership

In the absence 0f any “necessity” arising out 0f the administration 0f the estate for the

beneﬁt 0f creditors/interested persons,

I.C.

§15-3-71

1,

the Probate

Code

vests

title

and

ownership of Decedent’s property with the heirs or devisees, immediately upon death.

It

remains a well-established and statutorily mandated preference for in-kind distribution among
heirs, as

opposed

to liquidation

of estate property LC. §15-3-906. Hillen has been repeatedly
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reminded

his behavior is misguided, as there are

knows Vernon resolved
(decades)

Hamer
sale

,

n0

creditors,

and taxes were satisﬁed. Hillen

debts and liabilities 0f his Father and

all

Mother many years ago

and once the federal tax issue was resolved and paid from the proceeds from the

property, there remains

0f the Hamer property,

n0 need

now

t0 liquidate, as substantial cash

remained following the

being churned away with Hillen’s needless and senseless fees

accruing in these controversial confrontations With Hillen and his cadre 0f attorneys.
Hillen’s liquidation

and Vernon

is

assert Hillen is

pursuing these matters

unnecessary,

at best,

and

spiteful

and malicious

at worst.

simply creating funding for himself and his attorneys,

at the rate that typically

Gibson

who

are

exceeds $30, 000. 00+ per month, Which wasteful

expenditures are borne 2/3 by Vernon and 1/3 by Joseph.

This “administrative” disposition

is

approaching $2 Million.
In so liquidating, Hillen

is

creating unnecessary capital gains taxes, never the purpose 0f

a ﬁduciary, and not in the best interests of any heir. These actions taken by Hillen remain t0 be
in excess

0f his statutory authority, and should

his ﬁduciary duty,

Vernon seek

it

it

be necessary t0 claim

behavior a breach of

becomes remediable by an award 0f damages, LC. §15-3-712. Gibson and

to mitigate their

damages but

curtailing this needless

chooses t0 perpetuate his exposure t0 damages because 0f
erroneously

this

declared ownership

this

of Decedent’s property

ongoing behavior, but Hillen

erroneous disposition over his

interests

by the poorly

crafted

Instrument.
II.

Established Case

Law Limitations On Personal Representative Ownership

Idaho law has declared Hillen cannot lawfully be an “owner” 0f Decedent’s property,
notwithstanding the creation 0f the Rule 70(b) entry, as a personal representative cannot hold

ownership t0 a decedent’s

assets, so declared 101 years

ago

in

Lemp

401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919). That case remains consistent with the

adopted in Idaho in 1971, placing

title

v.

UPC

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397,
and LC. §15-3-101, as

and ownership with the devisees 0r

unanimously declared “The administrator 0r executor
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”

and

estate,

that principle remains the

code and Idaho case law, Fairchild
recently,

Ellmaker

N0

v.

Fairchild, 147 Idaho 147,

v.

an heir’s

magistrate

would

deliberately eliminate

would be committing a

title

676 P.2d 722 (1984), and more

Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390 (2015), cited in the Opening Briefs.

such intention would be a Violation 0f
magistrate

law today, conﬁrmed by the provisions 0f the probate

Judicial

and vested ownership

would commit such a

I.C.

any

heir’s interest, as created

by

statute, as

§15-3-101 and remain void and unenforceable. The

Cannon

Violation, as

in decedent’s assets

willful Violation 0f the

under

no authority
I.C.

and remains

N0

magistrate

Judicial

Cannon of

§15-3-101.

Code of Judicial Conduct and

Ethics, yet this wrongful disposition has lingered

exists t0 eliminate

t0 exist since

June

2,

2017, in

Violation of the statute, in Violation 0f the well-established case law, and the very prohibition
that expressly prevents a personal representative

III.

What Has

Transpired

from owning

estate assets.

BV The Unintended Consequences Of Hillen’s

Action’s?

Because 0f this claim
to eject

an heir and others, with n0 necessity for doing

v.

Gibson, Fourth Dist,

v.

VK. Smith

third

ﬁled four cases in District Court, seeking

t0 ownership, Hillen has

III,

Ada County Case N0.

Fourth Dist,

Action being Hillen v

CV 01-19-10368;

Ada County Case No.

Law

so, the ﬁrst action

this case, Hillen

the second Action being Hillen

CV 01-19-10367,

Oﬂices 0f Vernon K. Smith,

being

et al,

currently

on appeal, the

Ada County Case N0. CV01-

19-20686, ﬁled and served 0n Vernon, the 2/3““ heir, currently on appeal, and the fourth Action
being, Hillen v Riverside Farms, Ina,

the entity

managed by Vernon

Ada County Case No. CV01-20-06707,

that continues t0

farm the Chinden Property to preserve the farm

exemption and maintain the programs that preserve the

none of which properties need

t0

be 0r should ever be

soil conditions

and

irrigation systems,

sold.

In none of these actions does Hillen’s pleadings articulate any

liquidate, just the essential

seeking to eject

bone ﬁde necessity

t0

element 0f “ownership” ﬁmdamental t0 advance an ejectment action
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in district court, nothing associated with the pre-requisites

is

for possession 0f the

exist,

using this the poorly crafted 70(b) Instrument to advance his “exclusive

titled

ownership” claim t0 the
It

UPC

0f creditor claims, as Hillen knows none

heirs’ interest in the property for satisfactions

and Hillen

under the

was thought

heirs’ property to

meet the

criterial

element 0f an ejectment action.

was placed With

the subject 0f this probate matter

the Magistrate Court,

yet Hillen proceeds to District Court, and the Magistrate appears unconcerned With that process
that invades her probate jurisdiction.

Can

a District Court exercise jurisdiction over a probate

controversy Where the personal representative pursues an

ownership

interest in

Does

Can

claim that impacts the heir’s

an estate?

the case law preclude a personal representative from claiming ownership of a

Decedent’s assets, and declare that n0 part 0f the Estate
supra)?

ej ectment

is

owned by

the ﬁduciary

(i.e.

Lemp,

avoid the requirement 0f necessity that must be

a personal representative

established in probate court before effectuating the right t0 obtain possession 0f property from

UPC

an heir? Are there requirements built into the

that preclude

any attempt

to liquidate the

heirs’ assets?

Hillen sought to avoid “necessity”

by

the improper use of the Instrument t0 claim his

“ownership” theory to avoid compliance with the limitations established in the UPC.
chose the District Court forums as he

remained in the probate
t0 speciﬁcally avoid

court,

and

knew he was up

his behavior

against the necessity requirement if he

would be vehemently challenged, so he wanted

having to prove the existence of necessity, though having before received

the right to sell the property

on the minimum ﬂoor price established by the

Hillen could not reach, but decided t0

instead

Hillen

sell for less

went the avenue of claiming Exclusive

titled

heirs, a

without consent from the 2/3““

ﬂooring
heir.

He

ownership” with the dubious Rule 70(b)

Appellant’s Reply Brief

P.

28

entry, avoiding the required statutory route to seek possession

The

under the

statute.

distinctions that arise out 0f the statutory limitations placed

upon

the exercise 0f a

“power”, as exercised by a personal representative, in contrast to Hillen’s claim as “sole owner”

of Decedent’s property, are manifestly signiﬁcant in determining the authority to be exercised

by

the personal representative.

If Hillen

he

heirs,

is

were the “sole owner” 0f Decedent’s property,

n0 longer subject

t0 his trust obligation to heirs,

t0 the exclusion

0f the statutory

nor subject t0 heirs’ corresponding

statutory authority to restrain unauthorized actions (LC. §15-3-607),

and seek damages for

breach of ﬁduciary duty (LC. §15-3-712). Hillen was acting upon that potential immunity.
This court must weigh seriously the fact that If Hillen were the “sole owner” 0f

Decedent’s property, the heirs’
restrain Hillen or recover

trust interest

damages

for breach

obligations should not be eliminated

scope of his statutory authority.
right

and claims
Hillen

t0 assert the

fails t0

has been extinguished, and no longer standing to

by

of ﬁduciary duty, inasmuch as those statutory

the unauthorized actions of Hillen, acting outside the

Thus, this court must correct the error and preserve an heir’s

ﬁduciary breaches occurring in these proceedings.

embrace the statutory distinction between “ownership” and the statutory

necessity required before authorized to take “possession” of any assets, a distinction that

is

highly signiﬁcant t0 the fate of the assets, and Hillen’s quest has been to liquidate assets, (his

Chapter 7 Trustee mentality, his only experience) a resulting consequence
gains tax imposed

assets

owned by

upon the owners 0f the property by

is

to create a capital

the reckless acts of liquidation of these

the heirs. Neither the statute nor Idaho case law support Hillen’s liquidation

quest 0r claim to ownership.

Signiﬁcant distinctions arise out of statutory limitations placed upon exercise of a
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“power” by a personal representative, opposed

“owner” 0f

to Hillen’s ﬁctitious claim the sole

Decedent’s property. Hillen cannot be deemed the “sole owner” 0f Decedent’s property, to the
exclusion 0f Decedent’s heirs, as he has a statutory trust obligation to heirs, and must remain
subject to heirs’

statutory right to restrain his unauthorized actions (LC.

statutory right t0 recover

damages

This behavior of Hillen

§15-3-607), and

for Hillen’s breach of ﬁduciary duty (LC. §15-3-712).

unfounded

is

in law,

and an unintended consequence by What

has been the formation 0f the magistrate’s unintended error by the poorly crafted 70(b) entry.

On Hillen’s Probate Authoritv

IV. Statutory Limitations

In contrast t0 ownership, Hillen

beneﬁt 0f creditors,
review under

if there

were

UPC provisions

may

creditors,

only seek a grant t0 possession, in

and

in

to

such a situation, his actions remain subject t0

be served by the magistrate’s Rule 70(b) entry was the

voidance 0f the transfer of Decedent’s assets to

who

VHS

Properties,

LLC

and return those speciﬁc

then being deceased, then can only statutorily vest in the heirs or

devisees, never a personal representative of any estate. Notwithstanding the magistrate’s

encompassing language Within the Rule 70(b)
the limited scope 0f the statutory

power and

entry, the effect can neither exceed, nor

15-3-701 et seq. and 15-3-901

that

he

is

disaster occurring

a11-

expand

authority that has been statutorily granted (and

limited) to a personal representative in the administration of an estate, as provided

The

the

as cited above.1

The only intended function

assets to Decedent,

trust, for

by LC. §§

et seq..

from Hillen’s expressly-stated objective

to liquidate the assets, is

defeating the heirs’ interests, as though his authority under the

UPC

is

no

different

than his limited experience as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, being what appears t0 be his
professional background. Hillen’s actions in the district court are predicated solely

1

upon

his erroneous claim t0 “ownership”

upon

0f Decedent’s property, not mere
and the remedies and restrictions they
provide and address the concern over the unauthorized actions of a personal representative Which is at the center 0f Hillen’s
misconduct, fueled by the magistrate’s erroneous Rule 70(b) entry.
Hillen’s claim in these cases has been based

“possession.” In a larger sense,

it is

the very application of the

UPC

statutes, the case law,
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“ownership” 0f Decedent’s property, excluding the
statutory right t0 “possession” for

which

is

ownership, not upon any

any speciﬁed purpose necessitated

the estate for the beneﬁt 0f creditors, but

regardless of need,

heirs’ statutory

upon

unwarranted idea he can liquidate

his

0f

in the administration

UPC,

seen to be a breach of his duty under the

assets,

as Hillen has

declared the intention t0 liquidate the heirs interests, a direct contravention to the express
standards requiring the preservation 0f estate properly under I.C. §15-3-906, and in—kind
distribution t0 heirs,

and

this gross contradiction

0f law and statutory limitations must be

corrected.

The

UPC

and case law

any probated Will, 0r

is

precise: “Estates

to heirs if

no Will

is

descend

Idaho law, heirs obtain and retain

death t0 successors identiﬁed by

probated, subject t0 limitations which

implemented through administration.” Ofﬁcial Comment

By

at

title,

personal representative that has a factual basis t0

I.C. § 15—3-101,

11

may be

1).

subject to divestment and possession

show

by

the

necessity for the exercise of the LC. §15—

3-711 power, limited by a required necessity for the administration of the estate for the beneﬁt

0f creditors 0r other interested parties. What Hillen
these four district court proceedings

and

in

its

place, claim

title

is

t0 by-pass

is

attempting t0 accomplish by his ﬁling

and disregard the existing statutory mandate,

t0 decedent’s property (instead

0f the

heirs),

doing as he wants

at his

sole discretion, believing he can escape liability if acting as an “owner”.
If Hillen is

then does

it

no longer required

to act

under the exercise of a statutorily-conferred power,

follow that Hillen no longer has any ﬁduciary duty to the heirs by What he

engaging, and does Hillen n0 longer have any duty t0 protect assets, and

Vernon, nor Joseph could challenge Hillen’s actions, as Hillen’s

is it

is

then that neither

liability

may

then be

extinguished by the unintended consequence of the misuse 0f the poorly crafted 70(b) entry?

This could never have been the intention of the magistrate, the legislature, the courts 0r the
well-established history 0f probate law before the adoption 0f the

UPC.

as t0 allow such

without statutory authority, in Violation of case law, beyond the magistrate’s exercise 0f
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is

its

jurisdiction,

and a breach 0f the ﬁduciary duty Hillen

A. The Probate Court

is

bound

to uphold.

Had N0 Authoritv, BV Use Of A Rule 70(b) Entrv, T0

An Heir’s Ownership Interest In Decedent’s Propertv, Obtained
As A Matter Of Law Under LC. §15-3-101
Defeat

Though

Supreme Court’s opinion was not

the Idaho

invited to address 0r decide any

question concerning the construction and application of the Rule 70(b) entry, the language 0f
that

Order — 0n

its

face

— cannot be construed

t0 support Hillen’s contentions that

it

conferred

ownership t0 Decedent’s property, as the Magistrate was seeking only t0 restore
Decedent, (though even then arguably was pursued in Violation 0f statutory
process requirements, and lack of in-personum jurisdiction over those from
actually taken). Prior to the death 0f Victoria H. Smith, her interests

Properties,

LLC, never

title

restraints,

whom

due

was

title

were placed With

to

VHS

a party t0 any probate proceeding 0r any appeal, and that transfer

was

speciﬁcally undertaken pursuant t0 Victoria’s direct Wishes and instructions in 2012.

The

“transfer” to Hillen,

as conditioned

upon What was

no matter how construed, could not exceed

stated t0 be Hillen’s capacity “as

Estate.” This conditional reference must

conﬁrm

his limited authority

personal representative 0f the

that Hillen can only

be authorized t0 take

possession of property, only upon and in the course of is exercise 0f a “power” consistent with
the provisions of the

UPC

concerning the authority and powers 0f a personal representative.2

A personal representative administering an estate is bound by the limitations imposed by
the

UPC. The Ofﬁcial Comment

to I.C. §15-3-703 notes statutory constraints

ctions, declaring that, “[A] personal representative’s authority is derived

2

upon a

their

from appointment by

it corresponds t0 the IRCP Rule 70. The last sentence 0f Rule 821 addresses issuance 0f an order for
of “possession,” as opposed t0 Rule 70’s singular focus transfer 0f “title.” (“When any entry is for the delivery of
possession, the party in Whose favor it is entered is entitled t0 a writ 0f execution 0r assistance upon application to the clerk”).
Although the IRFLP has no application here, it conﬁrms a known legal distinction between “possession” and “title” that has been
recognized in the rules. Even in the absence of corresponding “possession” language in Rule 70, in this matter the Rule 70(b)
entry must be construed as a re-vestment of title to the heirs — not to Hillen—to exercise only a “power” over the property as

Within IRFLP Rule 821

transfer

statutorily authorized, I.C. §15-3 -71

1,

when determined to be

necessary.
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known

the public agency

as the

Code

Court. But the

representative, in spite 0f the source 0f his authority,

settlement and distribution of the estate
statutory directions. See Sections 3-107

Hillen has been

acting

claiming to be the “exclusive
statutorily-conferred

Of concern,
Document,

to

and 3-704.

beyond

titled

,9

‘6

makes

statutory

powers and

in accordance with

.”
.

statutorily-conferred

his

clear the personal

it

proceed With the administration,

to

by erroneously

authority

owner” 0f Decedent’s property, divesting the

Which they have been bestowed immediately upon

heirs of all

death.

Within the language expressed Within the Rule 70(b) entry, 0n Page 2 0f the

references the scope of divestment extending t0

it

“individually,

title

by use of

is

also

Vernon K. Smith’s

capacity,

as personal representative,” (which he never has been), “as attorney-in—fact 0r

Upon What

agent 0r ﬁduciary,” and “any other capacity.”

authority does a magistrate divest an

heir of his statutorily decreed ownership of Decedent’s assets?

The use of this all-encompassing

“divestment” language raises concern as t0 the magistrate’s awareness of the
magistrate’s deliberate intent to eliminate

heir, in contradiction

0f

I.C.

Vernon K. Smith’s

§15-3-101?

It

UPC,

or

was

it

the

statutory interest as an “intestate”

has been the “preferred” belief

it

has been the

magistrate’s unfamiliar background With probate matters and her unawareness 0f the law?

The

magistrate had no statutory authority, no power, no jurisdictional basis to eliminate the interest

0f an Intestate heir
If this

statutorily vested

under

I.C.

§15-3-101.

Appellate Court continues the perpetuation 0f this artiﬁcial and unlawful

ownership being vested within Hillen, claiming a divestiture of the heir’s statutorily held
interests,

then each Intestate heir has been denied their statutory property rights without due

process of law, and the Rule 70(b) entry must be declared void, as a matter of law.

Neither the law, nor any good faith objective of the Rule 70(b) entry would permit such
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an unintended consequence. Hillen’s unauthorized premise 0f sole ownership operates t0
eliminate

all

statutory ownership interests.3

It is

impossible for any judicial ofﬁcer t0 eliminate

an heir’s vested interest Without statutory authority allowing such an action.4 — such an outcome

and actionable

constitutes an absurd

would not be

result, as the magistrate irrationally creating that absurdity

acting in a judicial capacity, the fundamental and essential factor for the grant 0f

judicial immunity.

By

analogy to the rules of contract construction, used in the interpretation 0f

court orders, n0 effect should be given to a court order that creates an absurd result. Schieche

v.

Pasco, 88 Idaho 36, 41, 395 P.2d 671, 673 (1964).

The conduct of a court

acting in excess 0f statutorily—conferred authority has been

addressed in the Opening Brief, wherein State

App. 2008) was

cited,

and

in that case the

v.

Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731

Court addressed the issue succinctly as follows:

[C]0urts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction
really

mean simply

(Ct.

that the court

When

committed error because the action

that

they

was

taken did not comply With governing law. For example, our appellate courts have
referred t0 a lack 0f “jurisdiction”

when perhaps more

motion or complaint was not timely ﬁled,
ﬁle the action

was not

satisﬁed, 0r that

not authorize the particular decision
146 Idaho

at

375, 195 P.3d

at

precisely

meaning

that a

that a condition precedent to the right t0

governing statutes 0r court rules did

made bv

the court.

(citations omitted)

734 (bold/underlined emphasis, and parenthetical

reference t0 “citations omitted,” added).

As Appellant addressed

previously,

decision as announced in People

v.

Armstrong then

cited t0 California’s

Supreme Court

American Contractors Indemnity C0., 33 Cal.4th 653, 16

Ca1.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004), wherein the proposition was adopted that a court, acting

contrary t0 authority conferred by statute, has acted in excess 0f its iurisdiction. 146 Idaho at

3

As identiﬁed previously, Vernon’s sister, Victoria Ann Converse, assigned her 1/3rd intestate t0 Vernon, such that Vernon holds
2/3““ ownership 0f the assets and Joseph has a 1/3‘d interest under the cuITent state of the proceedings. If the Rule 70(b) entry is
construed t0 eliminate Vernon’s intestate share, then as the remaining intestate heir, neither assigned nor expressly eliminated by
court order, would become the sole heir of the estate, a most absurd result never intended, assuming the magistrate adheres to the

Cannon of Judicial Conduct.
The “Slayer’s Act,” as codiﬁed

4

at I.C.

of an intestate heir’s interest in an

§15-2—803, would constitute an example of a statutory authority that permits elimination

estate.
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376, 195 P.3d at 735.

Our Supreme

As

such, this Rule 70(b) entry

Court, in State

must be held

to

be void.

Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979, 982 n.3

v.

(201 1) has expressly acknowledged the rationale that

was announced

in

Armstrong — where the

Court of Appeals differentiated between jurisdiction and authority, as announced in Armstrongs
Courts have authoritatively cited t0 Armstrong, subsequent t0 the Supreme Court’s decision in

Hartwig, as demonstrated in State
2014), and State

It

Vaughn, 156 Idaho

Steelsmith, 154 Idaho 577,

580

n.2,

13, 15,

319 P.3d 497, 499

288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2

(Ct.

(Ct.

App.

App. 2012).

remains t0 be neither rational nor judicially prudent for a Magistrate t0 allow Hillen t0

carry into effect

interest

v.

v.

he

is

what Hillen has construed and advocated

to

be his “ownership” 0f property

precluded from owning, given the prohibition announced in

Lemp

v.

Idaho 397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919), declaring “The administrator 0r executor

owner 0f any part 0f the

estate,

Lemp, 32
is

not the

and the pre-emptive statutory vesture of exclusive ownership

with the Decedent’s heir(s) immediately upon death of the Decedent.

No

Magistrate, acting with a judicious objective, and acting in the capacity as a judge,

exercising thoughtful jurisprudence,

mandated devolution 0f ownership
code,

vesting interests to

exclusively t0 the heirs.

N0

would engage

interests

in

an intentional Violation of the statutory

0f Decedent’s property required under the probate

someone other than mandated within
magistrate

is

the statute, expressly and

allowed to deliberately defy the statutory mandates 0f

property ownership, as t0 d0 so exceeds a magistrate’s jurisdictional authority.
Hillen’s persistent claim he has

become

the sole

owner 0f Decedent’s property

interests,

defying the statutory delegation 0f such interests, coupled With a magistrate’s failure t0 preserve
the statutory integrity

5

Until superseded

mandated by the UPC,

by a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court,

Appeals are binding precedent upon lower Idaho courts. State

is

quite disturbing, as

perpetuates an illogical

upon the same question, opinions of the Idaho Court of
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986-87, 842 P.2d 660, 665—66 (1992).

as issued
v.

it

Appellant’s Reply Brief

P.

35

use and an aberration in What was to be the intended objective and construction 0f this
procedural Instrument (Rule 70(b)), absurdly fostering a misplaced use 0f an Instrument t0
maliciously exceed the authority 0f a personal representative, and the misuse of the jurisdiction

and authority 0f the magistrate, void 0f any statutory 0r jurisdictional basis
act,

for the magistrate’s

serving to allow Hillen t0 use a document t0 serve a disingenuous and wrongful

tool wrongfully

used

to needlessly

and senselessly engage the liquidation 0f the

purpose—a

heirs’ property,

churning more irrational and unnecessary attorney fees for which the Idaho Bar Association

may have

an interest t0 investigate, as Hillen’s actions are inconsistent with the mandated

in-

kind distribution the legislature contemplated enacting these governing probate proceedings

upon adopting the Uniform Probate Code
exposed

t0

paying What

is fast

in 1971, yet

we

see an estate that has

no

creditors,

approaching $2 million in attorney fees and expenses t0 Hillen

and his cadre 0f attorneys, a very

frustrating event experienced

by these

heirs.

Hillen’s misguided behavior, and the magistrate’s reluctance t0 correct this gross error,

has perpetuated a destructive course of action by Hillen, and this Appellate Court must protect

and enforce the purpose and

integrity

of the statutory authority and devolution 0f property

ownership, and prevent such behavior that damages heirs,

and needlessly creates justiﬁable

claims for breach 0f Hillen’s ﬁduciary duties and responsibilities to protect and preserve the
successor interests of the heirs about which he has taken an oath to uphold and enforce the
limitations of his authority.

B.

The Rule

BV Hillen T0

70(b) Entrv, Construed

Transfer

“OWNERSHIP”

Of Decedent’s Property T0 Him, Was Never Placed At Issue Or Decided
Upon The Appeal Of The Holographic Will And Power Of Attornev
Appellant has addressed

this

construction Hillen continues t0 place

in the

upon

Opening

this

Brief, but considering the persistent

Rule 70(b) entry, and the magistrate’s
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failure t0

reign Hillen

right

in, this

conﬁrmed by

432 P.3d

6,

misguided proposition that Hillen pursues has never been an ownership

this Court’s

Decision in the Matter ofEstaz‘e omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 466,

15 (2018). His perception that

it

does invites further response, as this Court did not

engage in any disposition to conﬁrm Hillen’s ownership 0f Decedent’s property

interests, as this

Court never embraced Hillen’s argument 0f his claimed ownership, and there

is

n0 support

Within any Appellate court precedent, as his position violates well-established case law, and
contradicts the statutory

As
issues,

scheme 0f ownership formulated within the Uniform Probate Code.

before stated, the bifurcated appeal taken t0 the Supreme Court addressed only two

Which were presented

t0,

and were

t0

be decided by, the Idaho Supreme Court in the

Matter ofEstaz‘e omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d
(1)

Did

the probate court err in ﬁnding the February 14, 1990 Holographic Will 0f Victoria H.

Smith invalid due
4,

15 (2018). Those two issues were:

6,

2012

transfers

to

undue inﬂuence? and

(2)

Did

of Victoria H. Smith’s property

the probate court err in setting aside the July

LLC, upon

interests t0 the

power 0f attorney used did not speciﬁcally authorize

gifting?

On

the ﬁnding the

both questions the Supreme

Court afﬁrmed the decision 0f the magistrate, ﬁnding no merit t0 address 0r embrace Hillen’s
claim t0 hold the ownership 0f Decedent’s property that

Once

the disposition

was made

is titled

to the heirs.

to set aside the transfers,

property would be returned to Decedent, and to then

by

Virtue of that act, the

become properly

transferred thereafter

pursuant t0 the statutory devolution established by the legislative enactment Within the Uniform

Probate Code.

No

one thought the statutory scheme mandated by the

statute

would encounter an

Instrument that would cause a head-on collision between the provisions of the

conceived procedural transfer from a voided transaction.

on

that appeal construing the

N0

issue

was being

UPC

and an

i11-

raised or decided

purpose 0r intent of the Rule 70(b) entry, as there was no
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controversy then in existence as t0
appeal, as Hillen had taken

n0 issues affecting

n0

action,

t0 establish a ripe

and Hillen was never a party

issue for

in the appeal, as there

was no envisioned controversy

were
at the

application as to the consequential effect 0f the Instrument that

restored ownership t0 Decedent, as

heirs, not

meaning 0r use by Hillen

his appointment or his behavior. There

was n0 erroneous

time, as there

its

it

was

clear the ownership, as a matter of law, vested in the

any personal representative, and Hillen had taken no action

to suggest

he was

planning any nefarious conduct.

N0
The

one envisioned such a misapplication would be pursued in Violation of the

return of the property t0 the Decedent’s heirs

the provisions of the

UPC,

unfortunately not reined in

On

the

was declared

despite

by

what

is

to

be exclusively governed by

being maliciously contended by Hillen currently, and

the magistrate.

Supreme Court appeal, n0

t0

was perceived

issues

were raised or decided

to the effect that Hillen

be the sole “owner” 0f Decedent’s property, as opposed t0 a statutory power t0

acquire possession, in

trust, solely for

the beneﬁt 0f Estate’s heirs, as provided

none of which

Nor was

made

for

to

statute.

existed.

Hillen

a party t0 the appeal, so that issue

by

the

UPC,

was never

ripe

any decision. The “divestment” language reﬂected in the Rule 70(b) entry was “understood”

accomplish re-instatement of Victoria’s ownership, from Which the

the devolution, as Victoria

was made on June

2,

was then deceased (September

2017, almost four years

later.

11,

UPC

would proceed With

2013) When the Rule 70(b) entry

There was no determination by the Supreme

Court that any heirs 0f the Decedent were divested of their statutory interest in Decedent’s
property, statutorily vesting under I.C. § 15-3-101, and there

of any such entry, Hillen was n0 longer subject to the

upon

UPC

was n0

constraints, as

Hillen’s actions as a personal representative; or that Hillen
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was

imposed by the
free t0

UPC

proceed With

unfettered liquidation of the heir’s vested property interests, without reference t0 any necessity
for liquidation 0f that property t0 address a creditors’ interest in the administration 0f the Estate,

as

none

existed.

This court expressed one statement Within the Idaho Supreme Court’s recitation 0f the
factual and procedural background 0f that appeal wherein the Court’s single reference t0 the

Rule 70(b) entry

is

the following:

judgment pursuant

to Idaho Rule of Civil
Victoria’s
real and personal property
Procedure 70(b), which vested title t0 all 0f
in the personal representative who had been appointed.

In June 2017, the court entered a

Vernon appealed these

decisions, and this Court granted Joseph’s motion
0f appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant t0 Idaho
Appellate Rule 44. This appeal follows the parties’ stipulation t0 bifurcate the
appeal t0 ﬁrst address anv matters occurring up to and including the posttrial iudgment under Rule 70(b) before considering anV matters occurring
thereafter. The personal representative of the estate, Intervenor-Respondent
Noah Hillen, is not participating in this portion 0f the appeal. 164 Idaho at
466, 432 P.3d at 15 (emphasis added).
for acceptance

Hillen construes this single statement to

assets, not the heirs as statutorily delegated

the

commentary

Decedent’ s

No

conﬁrm him

to

be the sole owner of Decedent’s

and mandated by case law, apparently construing

to default into a “divestment”

of the heir’s statutory devolution 0f ownership of

interests.

such issue of Hillen’s claimed ownership was raised, or What effect to be given the

magistrate’s efforts at ownership restoration, and

now

with the issue becoming ripe with the

mis—application from the intended act 0f that restoration,
Hillen’s unfounded reliance

Supreme Court

to

any

property interests t0

effect

upon

the 70(b) entry,

it

can be addressed here, challenging

when n0 such

issue

was decided by

the

of the Rule 70(b) entry transferring ownership of Decedent’s heirs’

become vested

personal representative that cannot

in

any manner contrary

own

t0 the

mandates of the

statute

a Decedent’s property by Virtue 0f Lemp, supra.
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with a

There was n0 issue developed 0r ripe for any adjudication on that appeal concerning the
interpretation, effect, or

the Decedent’s property, as ownership

title to

issues

Will,

enforcement 0f the 70(b) entry 0n the question 0f any determination 0f

were the Will and
it

transfers to the

remained uncertain Whether

is

exclusively controlled

LLC, and until
was

this

t0

by

the

UPC. The only

the appeal determined the validity 0f the

be a Testate probate, in which case Vernon was

the sole devisee and the designated personal representative under Victoria’s Holographic Will,

Vernon was among

or an Intestate probate, in which case

several heirs and remain subject t0

Hillen’s appointment.6

Hillen cannot construe the Court’s statement as being anything other than mere obiter

dictum, as was addressed in Smith

(Bistline,

J,

v.

Angeli, 122 Idaho 25, 35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (1992)

concurring in the reversal 0f the judgment below and the remand for further

proceedings) (“‘[A] remark by the way;’ that

is,

an observation 0r remark made by a judge in

pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some
the solution of a question suggested

0r essential to

its

determination;

.

.

by

rule, principle, 0r application

0f law, 0r

the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the case

.”).

Long-standing Idaho authority supports the interpretation of Idaho appellate decisions
differentiating

between issues actually raised and issues actually decided by the Court, and

matters simply referred to within the recitation 0f the case within the decision. Bashore

41 Idaho 84, 88, 238 P. 534, 534 (1925) (“‘There

what

is

said in an opinion and What

is

is

decided by

v.

Adolf,

a pronounced line of demarcation between

it.”

(citation omitted; italicized

6

emphasis

The Rule 70(b) Order was entered for the purpose 0f restoring Decedent’s prior ownership, not alter the statutory
scheme 0f ownership by unlawfully conveying ownership t0 a personal representative. The Idaho Supreme Court
neither addressed, nor decided, any issue other than the 2012 transfers 0f Decedent’s property t0 a limited liability
company, and the validity 0f the Decedent’s Holographic Will. The Supreme Court’s reference t0 the Rule 70(b)
entry provided a demarcation in the estate process 0f the bifurcation 0f what was an issue 0n appeal, deﬁning those
two issues on appeal, Which encompassed the time period in the scope of the bifurcated appeal. The appeal followed
the parties’ stipulation t0 bifurcate the appeal to address only the Will and validity of the transfers to the LLC, before
considering matters thereafter, as identiﬁed in 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15.
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added». See Idaho Schools For Equal Educational Opportunity

850 P.2d 724, 737 (1993) (McDeVitt,

C.J.,

v.

Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 586,

concurring and dissenting); North Side Canal C0.

v.

Idaho Farms C0., 60 Idaho 748, 758, 96 Idaho 232, 235-36 (1939); and Stark v. McLaughlin, 45
Idaho 112, 123, 261 P. 244, 245 (1927). This line of authority has a long-established history and

would mandate application 0f the Doctrine 0f Stare

Decisis.

This principle of interpretation, as applied to Idaho appellate opinions, and as based

upon

the Idaho

Supreme Court’s decision

Idaho’s U.S. District Court

AMX Intern,

in the light

Bashore, supra, has recently been applied by
Battelle

Energy Alliance, 744 F.Supp.2d

Inc.

v.

U.S.,

454 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072 (D. Idaho 2006)

itself has stated that its

opinions “must be considered and construed

in,

1087, 1091—92 (D. Idaho 2010); and

(“The Idaho Supreme Court

in

Hash

v.

0f the rule that they are authoritative only 0n the facts 0n which they are founded.

General expressions must be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are
used.

is

“There

decided by

is

a pronounced line 0f demarcation between What

it.”

(Citation omitted).’

Bashore

v.

is

said in an opinion and What

Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 238 P. 534 (1925)

(emphasis in original).”).
Hillen’s perceived construction 0f the Idaho

conﬁrmed

Supreme Court’s

his ownership, is inconsistent with not only the provisions

decision, claiming

0f the

UPC

(a right

it

of

possession and “power” for the satisfaction of creditor claims and other interested persons), but

remains expressly prohibited by the holding as t0 ownership mandated by the
prohibition announced in

Lemp

administrator or executor

is

7

v.

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

P. 222,

statute,

and the

223 (1919), (“The

not the owner 0f any part 0f the estate.7 The principle expressed

Although Lemp was decided under the 1864 Idaho Probate Code,

this principle

of law has not in any way been altered by

Idaho’s 1971 adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, and in fact has been embraced by and effectuated by the mandated
transference of Decedent’s interests immediately to the heirs or devisees upon death, and not to any appointed ﬁduciary by the
effects ofI.C.§15-3-101.
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within that case remains undisturbed authority in Idaho, With n0 negative treatment 0f that

authority,

conﬁrmed by Casemaker

decisions, In

Re MacDonnell ’s

Lemp

4.

Estate, 56

Nev

67 Idaho 294, 178 P.2d 382 (1947), Vaught
Caldwell

v.

has been subsequently cited Within four appellate

v.

346, 53 P.2d 625, (1936)

;

Malone

we

trust Will

Van Etten,

259 (1941); and

Struble, 62 Idaho 352, 120 P.2d

Thiessen, 50 Idaho 515, 92 P.2d 1047 (1939), and

v.

soon to be cited in

this appellate disposition.

Court judgments, judicial and administrative decrees, are subject to the same rules 0f
interpretation as the construction 0f contracts.

McKoon

v.

Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190

P.3d 925, 928 (2008); City ofPocatello v Spackman, 162 Idaho 302, 306, 396 P.3d 1184, 1188
(2017).

A prominent rule

existing law.

Path

of contract interpretation

LLP

t0 Health,

(“‘This Court has held that “it

every written

contract.

,9”,

interpretation in Application

(“What the court

213 (1946) (noting

.

.

that

.

.”);

Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016)

v.

(citations

omitted).

This

is

made

written into and

a part 0f

was expressly applied

rule

t0

the

0f Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206 P.2d 528, 533 (1949)

must be taken

and

in,

an executor must act “in

appeal in Matter 0f Estate 0f Smith, supra,
applies t0 any interpretation t0 be

was decided

in

strict

UPC in
is,

compliance with the law

as a matter

of law,

.

.

.”).

interpreted

incorporated within and

the Rule 70(b) Entry as well as any

Supreme Court’s opinion then 0n

it,

.

1971, in effect at the time of the referenced

made regarding

The Rule 70(b) Entry can only be
provisions, not in contradiction of

in connection With the statutes as they then

In re Anderton’s Estate, 67 Idaho 160, 163, 174 P.2d 212,

The adoption 0f the provisions 0f the

interpretation 0f what

they are interpreted in regard t0 the then-

axiomatic that extant law

is

said, therefore,

existed and applied,

is

appeal.

and applied consistent With the

UPC

which confer upon a personal representative only a
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“power”, not ownership, allowing a right t0 “possession” only
administration 0f the estate for the beneﬁt ofcreditors

71

1.

When necessary for

and other interestedpersons.

I.C.

the

§15-3-

Hillen never alleged a need under I.C. §15-3-711 within the pleadings of this ejectment

action, as Hillen

knew no such need

existed.

He

alleged ownership only, going outside the

probate court’s jurisdiction t0 avoid a determination as to the application 0f the provisions of the

UPC

and the exclusive property ownership

sell for substantially less

is

of the heirs in the property Hillen sought to

than the ﬂooring set with the heirs.

Hillen’s argument the Idaho

property

interests

Supreme Court conﬁrmed

specious, and he cannot be allowed t0

roam

free

his

ownership 0f Decedent’s

and footloose with the heirs

property interests and g0 about liquidating these unique property holdings in contradiction of
the restrictions placed

upon

authority he has within

his ﬁduciary responsibilities,

Which

and

to exercise his responsibilities,

his disregard for this limited

and

t0

exceed that authority

is

actionable,

and supports a claim for damages. Hillen’s perception and unruly behavior must be

summarily

rejected,

and the Rule 70(b) Entry deﬁned not

to Violate the

UPC

and the statutory

devolution 0f property ownership and the mandates of the case law.

C. There

Can Be N0 Enforcement Of A Void Instrument

Signiﬁcant constitutional issues arise
party are

impugned and

jurisdiction, 0r the

assailed

power

when

substantive due process rights 0f a third

by a magistrate Without

as an inferior court to

statutory authority

do What has been done by the expressed, yet

unauthorized language used in the Rule 70(b) entry. The magistrate
statutory provisions Within the

UPC

and inpersonum

is

either

0n ownership 0f Decedent’s property

maware of

the

interests, 0r the

magistrate knowingly engaged in a statutory Violation and a wrongful taking 0f property, in
Violation of the due process requirements under the United States and Idaho Constitutions,
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rendering the entry void as a matter 0f law.

BHA

Property interests cannot simply be taken by a court in Violation 0f due process.
Investments, Inc.

v.

City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (2004).

a void Order or Judgment

is

characterized as a taking in Violation of the 14th

United States Constitution. Seaboard Air Line Ry. C0.
1921).

Any

n0

offending the statutorily vested interests 0f an heir of a Decedent.

now

5th

Amendment and

14th

The lack of due
is

the

Fowler, 275 F. 239, 240 (W.D.N.C.,

Rule 70(b) entry,

Violations,

upon

Amendment to

jurisdictional basis behind the irrational usage of the

applied.

act

continued enforcement 0f a “void” Instrument constitutes a “taking” 0f property

interests, speciﬁcally

is

v.

Any

process,

combined with the

There

as being s0

Amendment

not the background of an enforceable Judicial decree.

Yet Hillen seeks
jurisdictionally void

to act

upon

Rule 70(b)

malfeasance, as Hillen

is

this statutorily unauthorized, constitutionally defective,

entry.

and

This can only be Viewed as a knowing act of

an attorney, accepted the appointment t0 serve as a personal

representative under the restrictions and limitations formulated Within the

UPC, and took an

oath to perform a statutory responsibility within the conﬁnes 0f the Uniform Probate Code, and
not act as a Chapter 7 Trustee.

While the defects remain of concern,
98

S. Ct.

as declared in

1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley

(1871), and Sierra Life Ins. C0.

v.

v.

Stump

v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

Fisher 13 Wall. 335, 351, 2O L. Ed. 646

Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627, 586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978),

Appellant and Vernon focus their preference to correct this unintended consequence 0f the
erroneous mechanism used by the magistrate t0 restore property ownership of the deceased, and
operate Within the requirements 0f the

UPC. The

continuing disregard for the statutory

limitations affecting vested interests of heirs serves to perpetuate needless
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damages

to the heirs

and the disrupted
this court

interests

0f the third parties damaged by Hillen’s unauthorized

activity,

and

has the inherent authority to identify What was the limited purpose of the Rule 70(b)

entry in this probate proceeding.

The entry cannot

alter the statutory vestiture

ownership emanating from the demise of the Decadent to someone
a Decedent’s property. This court must declare Hillen’s

court declared the effects

v.

cannot

own any

ﬂawed and misplaced

and void any unconstitutional interpretation of the ownership
In Sierra Life Ins. C0.

who

of property
part 0f

interpretation,

restoration.

Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627, 586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978), the

When there

is

lack 0f personal jurisdiction and due process, and here a

lack of statutory authority, stating:

“Furthermore, because of the serious ramiﬁcations and consequences which
could follow from a court acting without jurisdiction over the subject matter, we
recognize that it is important t0 keep that concept clearly deﬁned. For example,
the defense 0f lack 0f iurisdiction over the subiect matter is never waived
(LR.C.P. 12(h)); purported iudgments entered bv a court without iurisdiction
over the subiect matter are void and as such are subiect t0 collateral attack,
and are not entitled t0 recognition in other states under the full faith and credit
clause 0f the United States Constitution (Restatement 0f Judgments, 6‘ 7
(194222. In addition, judges Who act without jurisdiction over the subject

matter may be liable for damages in civil actions. Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335,
20 L.Ed. 646 (1871).

The

authority that requires relief from void Instruments

under the law. See McClure Engineering, Ina,
P.3d 1189, 1192

(Ct.

App. 2006).

adversely affected by

it.

judgment can be attacked

Cuevas
at

v.

can be attacked

at

any time by any person

Barraza, 155 Idaho 962, 318 P.3d 952, (2014).

any time by any person adversely affected by

138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). This Court
constitutes a void judgment."

197, 108 P.3d 340,

not a discretionary principle

Channel 5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 953, 155

A void judgment
v.

is

Hartman

v.

United Heritage Prop.

344 (2005).
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"

it.

Burns

v.

A

void

Baldwin,

narrowly construe[s] what

&

Cas. C0., 141 Idaho 193,

The concept 0f a void Instrument was addressed
v.

Skinner,

in

Jim

& Maryann Plane Family

Trust

157 Idaho 927, 933, 342 P.3d 639, 645 (2015), referring t0 lack 0f personal

jurisdiction,

subject matter jurisdiction, and Violation of due process. These jurisdictional

defects are present in this Rule 70(b) entry, as the Instrument violates the statutorily

mandated

devolution of a Decedent’s property, and the magistrate has no jurisdictional authority t0 divest

an

heir,

Which ownership cannot be defeated by an unconstitutional and

defective Rule 70(b) entry

that exceeds

by a magistrate

The Supreme Court only ruled upon

the transfers 0f

both

its

power and

jurisdictionally

statutory authority.

2012 made under the power, declared

invalid for lack of gifting authority, but the Court never ruled

upon

the effect of the language

within the magistrates 70(b) entry.
Hillen cannot be allowed to deprive heirs 0f their statutory property rights, and the law

does not support the use being

made 0f the

70(b) entry. Hillen must sense this shortcoming, as

ownership in an ejectment action not only does matter, but

made

Hillen cannot be

cannot meet the

the “exclusive

criteria to

is

fundamental to such an action. If

owner” of Decedent’s property by the 70(b)

entry,

he

support an ejectment action, forcing Hillen t0 proceed within the

probate court t0 establish “necessity” t0 take possession, to conduct a sale for substantially less

than the authorized ﬂooring, as Hillen could never reach the

no creditor claims

t0 require a liquidation.

minimum

ﬂooring, and there were

There has been n0 basis to disrupt Gibson’s 16 years

of crucial beneﬁt to the property, for Which the heirs have beneﬁted since

their statutorily vested

ownership.

Appellant seeks t0 mitigate damages and function Within Vernon’s 2/3rds ownership
interest as

an heir of Victoria’s

There

is

n0

assets, as

Gibson has been a tremendous beneﬁt

legal basis for the ejectment

t0 the property.

of “an unwanted party from Estate property”,
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if

there

is

n0 consent from the

exclusive titled ownership

heirs,

and

that concept

was never alleged 0r argued;
knowing

asserted in Hillen’s Complaint,

ejectment action, as conﬁrmed by

Ada County Highway

that

it

element

has only been

is critical

Dist. v Total Success Investments,

145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), where proof 0f ownershig,

is

t0

any

LLC,

foundational to achieve

standing. Hillen structured his foundational requirement through this ill-conceived Rule 70(b) entry

to achieve his “self-interest” ejectment efforts,

act within the limits

challenged by Gibson and Vernon, as Hillen, must

0f his ﬁduciary capacity, and can never be a

property, an aspect 0f law he

is

bound

to respect,

conﬁned

mandates articulated Within the Uniform Probate Code
interests are

ﬁduciary,

that

titled

owner 0f a Decedent’s

t0 his limitations

and

restricted

by

the

he well knows ownership of property

immediately vested With the heirs upon death, subl'ect only to administration by the

empowered

t0 take possession

upon showing 0f necessity

for the satisfaction

0f creditors’

claims and other interested persons, but absent such claims 0r interests, no basis t0 employ the
unconstitutional entry of a Rule 70(b) entry, t0 wrongfully enable a personal representative to eject

an occupant and terminate a valuable service that beneﬁts the

“titled

owner” of the

heirs.

V. Conclusion
This appeal seeks reversal 0f the Judgment entered by the lower court upon the
Pleadings, requiring “ownership”, the fundamental element to prevail in an ejectment action,

which element Hillen does not possess. The lower court appears “ownership” “does not matter”,
despite that being Hillen’s basis for ejectment. Appellant

reason Hillen alleged he was the “exclusive

is

void 0f any statutory authority for

its

titled

entry.

As

would argue

it

does matter, the very

owner”, relying upon the 70(b) Instrument that
a matter 0f law, only heirs are the vested and

titled

owners of Decedent’s property, and the right of possession has not been taken from the

heirs.

Consequently, Hillen had n0 standing t0 either allege 0r prevail upon an ejectment action,
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as he does not,

and cannot, hold the exclusive ownership of Decedent’s property, and the Rule

70(b) entry, in any event,

is

void

if

used t0 claim Hillen’s ownership to support an ejectment

action.

This court must compel the mandatory application of the statute, as mandated by Hoﬁ’er
v.

160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681

Shappard,

as

(2016),

the

statutory

scheme (UPC)

unambiguious and remains the controlling law, in the absence of a necessity

is

to satisfy creditor

claims and interest deﬁned by statute. There shall be no severance of the heir’s titled ownership

and possessory

interests,

and the personal representative holds n0 ownership

interest to

advance

an ejectment action.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of July, 2020.
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